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fix(pg-connection-string): get closer to libpq semantics for sslmode
#2709
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@charmander do we have an idea when this will land / get released as part of pg9? |
Help @brianc to merge this |
@brianc / @hjr3 what's the status on this? We've a PR on Mastodon blocked by this change: mastodon/mastodon#25483 |
@ThisIsMissEm Is that PR blocked on this? It looks more like it would be made unnecessary by this. |
I'm saying "blocked" in the sense of if upstream is going to fix, that'd be preferable to a fix in our code for it |
@ThisIsMissEm On second read, it looks like the Mastodon PR is necessary either way. Unless you were planning on deleting all of that code if this were merged and released soon enough? |
This PR introduces breaking changes. We should probably:
|
@hjr3 that sounds good to me! |
Just wanted to follow up and see if there's any plans for forwards progress on this? |
Over on Mastodon, @ThisIsMissEm asked if I might know some Node.js TLS/SSL people who might be able to review this. I hope I'm not pinging too widely, but I'm certainly interested in trying to unblock things for the Mastodon project so....hey, can anyone review? @indutny @jasnell @joyeecheung @tniessen @pimterry @panva @mertcanaltin |
I’m not really up to speed on the Mastodon context here, but some information, if it helps:
|
@charmander |
break | ||
} | ||
case 'verify-ca': { | ||
config.ssl.checkServerIdentity = function () {} |
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On second thought, even though libpq has and has documented this same problem, maybe we should enforce that config.ssl.ca
is truthy here.
config.ssl.checkServerIdentity = function () {} | |
if (!config.ssl.ca) { | |
throw new Error('sslmode=verify-ca requires specifying a CA with sslrootcert') | |
} | |
config.ssl.checkServerIdentity = function () {} |
The main issue with this would be for anyone who wants to add a ca
key to the returned config.ssl
after parsing. I don’t think a warning is the way to go (too easy for those who need it to miss or ignore, and annoying for those who don’t need it to suppress). Would adding a whole options parameter to support this (parse(str, {deferSslCa: true})
– probably a better name option) be too much? (Related issue, merging configuration with a connection string is hard in general: #3327)
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Alternatively, the check could go in pg, e.g. by pg-connection-string exporting const NO_VERIFY = () => {}
and pg throwing if config.ssl.checkServerIdentity === NO_VERIFY && !config.ssl.ca
.
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added the check in 74a314e
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Is it really needed to enforce config.ssl.ca
for this sslmode?
If config.ssl.ca
is not specified, the TLS client will use the CA certificates already available via tls.getCACertificates('default')
, which can include certificates included in the bundled certificate store, the system's trusted store and any extra certificate configured via the NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS
env variable. Docs
In our implementation, we use the latter option (NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS
) to configure the CA certificates from our Postgres endpoint and it works fine.
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TIL
I will unwind this change. It will match the behavior in lib/pq@585ef5d#diff-4f427d2b022907c552328e63f137561f6de92396d7a6e8f6c2ea1bcf0db52654R836-R838
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@pmalouin This is exactly why I thought a check might be useful :) Anyone can get a valid certificate from a system-trusted CA, simply by requesting one for a domain that they actually control. Without config.ssl.ca
enforced, such a certificate can then be used to MITM any sslmode=verify-ca
connection, providing essentially the same security level as sslmode=require
.
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This behavior seems consistent, well documented and understood by those who want libpq compatibility. If someone has a MITM concern, then they should use sslmode=verify-full
or specify a more narrow sslrootcert
.
Also, I am not sure the proposed check will have the intended results. If a user encounters this error, they will almost certainly add &sslrootcert=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
to the connection string and move on. In fact, I originally thought specifying the system CA (or a custom CA) was the intention of the check because I did not realize that the TLS client will use the CA certificates already available.
All that being said, I did see the following chart in the JDBC docs which outlines the risks in a way that is easy to understand. I think we should incorporate a similar chart into the README so people are aware of the MITM risks.
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I mentioned that it was documented by libpq in my original comment, but I think @pmalouin’s comment demonstrates that the implications are still not obvious to people. A more descriptive error could be a good idea. I don’t think any amount of documentation is sufficient to replace the check.
@ThisIsMissEm In the end it’s up to @brianc, but I’m against supporting Looking back at more of the context and questions, e.g.
(Re: managed database providers: It looks like DigitalOcean, the managed database provider in mastodon/mastodon#11445, is giving bad advice by encouraging people to connect with |
I suggested a path forward here: #2709 (comment) It is not clear to me why we would need to wait until pg 9 to release pg-connection-string v3.0 |
@hjr3 As I mentioned in the same comment:
i.e. we don’t need to wait, but the new major version of pg-connection-string won’t be the default dependency in pg (that it uses to parse |
I somehow missed that. My apologies. I understand and agree with what you are saying. I do think it is fairly common for teams to use newer versions of pg-connection-string with pg. |
In mastodon, we already directly pull in |
I want to continue working on If @brianc can give me merge permissions, I can move the package forward. If there are concerns with my ability to merge other packages, I started #3129 which should allow us to enforce the proper permissions. |
hey sorry I had the flu last week...literally never been that sick before in my life. still only about 80% back to health. Yeah @hjr3 I've "known" you for a long time on github, and trust you. happy to give you merge permissions! You might need to ping me if you need a critical release done to npm at any time, but even though sometimes I go awol for a week or two I am always watching the repo...just hard to do computer stuff when you think you might actually die from the flu! Instead of merging this myself I'm going to give you permissions @hjr3 so we can make sure they work. :) |
@hjr3 sent you a collaborator invite. |
I originally wanted to merge this in as-is and publish a 3.0.0. I now wonder if we should add a flag (.e.g. |
I'd probably say just release 3.0.0 with this as default and thoroughly document the breaking changes |
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same as my previous review
Summary
We have found that the handling of the
sslmode
connection string parameter is inconsistent with other PG libraries and with the reference libpq documentation. This PR proposes some changes tosslmode
behavior that are more aligned with libpq.Detailed
sslmode
behaviorHere is the list of all
sslmode
values and their expected behavior with this PR:sslmode=verify-full
Require an SSL connection and verify the CA and server identity.
No changes in this PR.
sslmode=verify-ca
(changed)Require an SSL connection and verify the CA, but not the server identity. This is achieved by setting
ssl.checkServerIdentity
to a no-op function (see docs). Previously, this mode behaved likeverify-full
but that was not consistent with the libpq implementation.sslmode=require
(changed)If a root CA is provided via the
sslrootcert
parameter of the connection string, it behaves likeverify-ca
. Otherwise, require an SSL connection but do not verify CA and server identity (ssl.rejectUnauthorized
is set tofalse
).Previously, this mode behaved like
verify-full
but that was not consistent with the libpq implementation.sslmode=no-verify
Require an SSL connection but do not verify CA and server identity (
ssl.rejectUnauthorized
is set tofalse
).No changes in this PR. Note: this mode is not documented in libpq and does not appear to be broadly supported in other libraries, but has been kept as-is for the sake of backwards-compatibility. One option could be to mark it as deprecated since
sslmode=require
could be an alternative, but doing so might have little value for this project.sslmode=prefer
(changed)Require an SSL connection but do not verify CA and server identity (
ssl.rejectUnauthorized
is set tofalse
). Previously, this mode behaved likeverify-full
but that was not consistent with the libpq implementation.In reality, this mode should be even less strict and support a fallback logic from SSL to non-SSL connection if SSL is not accepted by the server. Implementing a fallback logic seems to be more complex to solve and I did not dare touch this, but this could eventually be addressed if users of this library deem this mode valuable.
sslmode=allow
Not supported by this library.
No changes in this PR. For this mode also, there could be an opportunity to implement a fallback logic from non-SSL to SSL, but I did not dare touch this and I don't have data that suggests that this might be valuable for this project.
sslmode=disable
Only try a non-SSL connection.
No changes in this PR
An important note is that this PR potentially introduces semver breaking changes, in particular because it relaxes the security constraints of some
sslmode
values:sslmode=prefer
is less strict, users should switch tosslmode=verify-full
to keep parity.sslmode=require
is less strict, users should switch tosslmode=verify-full
to keep parity.sslmode=verify-ca
is less strict, users should switch tosslmode=verify-full
to keep parity.Prior discussions about
sslmode
I believe this PR addresses concerns raised in these two GH issues in the past:
#2281
#2009
In particular, there has been one case where the
sslmode=verify-ca
is currently too strict when connecting through AWS RDS Proxy, but the work-around of usingsslmode=no-verify
would disable CA verification completely.Other languages/libraries and their support for
sslmode
Just as a reference, these two libraries are also trying to be more or less consistent with libpq:
disable
,require
,verify-ca
andverify-full
only.Thanks for considering this change and please let me know how I can polish this further for acceptance 🙏